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Abstract 
We analyze sequential second-price auctions under complete information involving two or more bidders with similar 
decreasing marginal valuations. Krishna (1999) designed a 2-bidder numerical example to show the existence of two 
symmetric equilibria characterized by an asymmetric allocation and weakly declining prices. We generalize Krishna's 
insights by showing that symmetric (asymmetric) allocations imply constant (weakly declining) price patterns and we 
derive the necessary conditions supporting symmetric allocations. The conditions become increasingly restrictive as the 
number of object increases.
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Bernheim and Whinston (1986) have argued that the complete information assumption is 
appropriate for the analysis of frequently-held auctions involving the same bidders. In 
such settings, the bidders know each other’s valuations, but the seller is poorly informed. 
It is easy to construct a second-price auction under complete information involving two 
symmetric bidders with declining valuations that will support two symmetric equilibria
1 
characterized  by  a  constant  price  pattern.  Consider  the  outcome  tree  of  the  game 
illustrated in Figure 1. Arrows denote the allocation in each subgame and prices are given 
next to the paths. At each node, the bidders’ gross payoffs are put in parentheses. Each 
unit  could  go  either  to  bidder  A  (left  branch)  or  to  bidder  B  (right  branch).  The 
equilibrium outcome is solved by backward induction and bids reflect the opportunity 
cost of not winning. The outcome tree, unlike the extensive form, features gross payoffs 
at every node which are obtained through subgame replacement. At nodes associated to 
the j
th object, gross  payoffs are defined as the sum of valuations for objects won along 
the given path minus the sum of prices for objects that would be won among the last n-
j+1 objects.  For the last object, gross payoffs are the sum of the valuations.  
In Figure 1, bidders’ valuations for the first and second objects are  1 θ  and  2 θ . 
Bidder i has gross payoffs of  1 2 θ θ + ,  1 θ  and 0 from winning both objects, one object and 
nothing at the end nodes. Provided bidder A won the first object, he would bid his gross 
payoff differential  2 θ for the second object. Conditional on bidder A having won the first 
object, bidder  B would  have a  gross payoff differential of  1 0 θ −  and would win the 
second object at price  2 2
B p θ = . Conditional on the first object being won by bidder B, 
bidder A would win the second object by bidding  1 θ  and paying  2 2
A p θ = .  Moving up the 
tree,  the  payoffs  at  the  two  nodes  account  for  allocations  and  prices  derived  for  the 
second object: ( ) 1 1 2 , θ θ θ −  vs ( ) 1 2 1 , θ θ θ − . Both bidders end up bidding  2 θ , knowing that 
if they lose the first object they will get the second at the same price.   
As for the Heckscher-Ohlin model in the trade literature, the results of this 2x2 
auction are not robust when the number of objects n or the number of bidders increases.  
In an example of a four-object auction involving two bidders with symmetric valuations, 
Krishna  (1999)  uncovered  two  symmetric  equilibria  characterized  by  an  asymmetric 
allocation and declining prices with one bidder winning three objects and the other bidder 
getting  a  single  object.  The  multiplicity  of  equilibria  arises  because  bidders  can  be 
interchanged.
2 
The analysis of sequential auctions under complete information with symmetric 
bidders has been largely ignored in the literature and it is the purpose of this note to shed 
more light on such auctions. We show that when the number of objects is even, but 
greater or equal to 4, symmetric allocations and a constant price trend arise under specific 
                                                 
1 We assume throughout that bidders have identical declining valuations. Equilibria are symmetric when 
they generate the same sequence of prices. Bidders can then be interchanged.     
     
2 When the two bidders have asymmetric valuations, Katzman (1999) has shown that the equilibrium is 
unique, possibly inefficient and that the price pattern may be constant or declining. Gale and Stegeman 
(2001) have analyzed cases with asymmetric valuations with more than two objects.   
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conditions about bidders’ valuations. Otherwise the allocations are uneven and prices are 
declining with possibly flat segments. When the number of objects is uneven, allocations 
are asymmetric and prices are declining.  
 
2. The model 
The auction is a sequential second-price one involving two completely informed bidders 
with  identical  decreasing  marginal  valuations:  1 2 1 n n θ θ θ θ − > >...> > .
3  Part  of  the  4-
object  version  of  the  game  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2.  In  this  instance,  a  symmetric 
allocation with bidders A and B getting two objects each can be achieved through six 
equilibria provided valuations decrease at a decreasing rate,  2 3 3 4 θ θ θ θ − > − : {A,B,A,B}, 
{B,A,B,A}, {A,A,B,B}, {B,B,A,A}, {A,B,B,A} and {B,A,A,B}. Equilibrium prices are 
constant and the seller’s revenue is 3 4 R θ = . If the bidders had symmetric valuations such 
that  2 3 3 4 θ θ θ θ ′ ′ ′ ′ − < − ,  prices  would  weakly  decline 
{ } 3 2 4 2 4 3 2 4 3 4 3 , , , p θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ = − − + − + − , one player would get 1 object, the other 
would  get  3  and  2 3 4 2 R R θ θ θ
< ′ ′ ′ ′ = + +
>
.
4  Symmetric  allocations  are  also  possible  in 
higher-dimensional games. We show that the condition just derived for the n = 4 case is a 
special case of a more general set of conditions. 
 
Proposition 1: Consider two bidders {A,B} having similar strictly declining marginal 
valuations and let k≡ n/2 where n is an even number of successive second-price auctions 
with  4 n ≥ . There are multiple symmetric equilibria with a constant price pattern or 
weakly declining pattern generating identical payoffs for the two bidders. The bidders get 
the same number of objects k if and only if the price pattern is constant which requires 
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− > − − ∀ = − ∑ ∑ .  
 
Proof: Intuitively, bidder A must be indifferent between his allocation and that of bidder 
B, whether the allocations are symmetric or asymmetric. Under a symmetric allocation 
derived through backward induction, let us assume that bidder A has won k objects and 
                                                 
3 The case of endogenous valuations is analyzed by Krishna (1999). In her two-object auction, a snowball 
effect arises because bidders use the object as inputs and compete on the “output” market. The bidder who 
won the first object has a higher valuation for the second object because that second object would secure a 
monopoly  position.  In  our  case,  we  treat  valuations  as  exogenous.  This  could  be  rationalized  by  the 
existence of alternative marketing mechanisms preventing monopoly outcomes. For example, the daily hog 
auction in the Canadian province of Quebec involved a small number of bidders. However, they get a large 
share of their hog supply through a pre-attribution/formula pricing mechanism based on historical market 
shares.    
 
4 Consider the following examples with valuations adding up to the same total such that the seller’s revenue 
from  selling  the  4  objects  as  a  block  would  be  the  same:  { } 10,9,6,5 θ = ,  { } 10,9,6.7,4.3 θ′= , 
{ } 10,9,8,3 θ′′= and  { } 10,8,7,5 θ′′′= . When the objects are sold sequentially, the first set of valuations 
produces a symmetric allocation, identical prices p = 6 and revenue R = 24. For the asymmetric allocations 
with weakly declining prices, we have 24.3, 23, 25. R R R ′ ′′ ′′′ = = =     
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bidder  B  has  won  0 1 j k ≤ ≤ −   objects.  When  1 j k = − ,  one  object  remains  to  be 
auctioned. Bidder A bids his valuation for the n
th and last object and this is the price that 
bidder B will pay given that his valuation is higher:  1 1
B
k j k k p θ θ + + + = < . Thus, at the (n-1)
th 
auction, bidders know that if they lose the object they will win the last one and gain 
1 k k θ θ + − . Because bidders must be indifferent between winning and losing the (n-1)
th 
object, prices for the (n-1)
th and n
th objects must be the same. This is just like the  2 2 ×  
auction in Figure 1.  
Consider now  2 j k = − . Bidder B knows that bidder A has used up his first k 
valuations. Bidder B can win the last two objects by bidding in excess of  1 k θ +  and gain 
1 1 1 k k k k θ θ θ θ − + + − + −  for these last two objects, or win one object and gain  1 2 k k θ θ − + −  or 
win none and gain nothing. The latter option is dominated because valuations are strictly 
declining. If bidder B is to win the last two objects, it must be that:  1 1 2 k k k k θ θ θ θ + + + − > −  
or valuations must decrease at a decreasing rate at the k
th valuation.  This is the condition 
required to have symmetric allocations for the 4-object auction in Figure 2. If it is not 
met, an asymmetric allocation emerges and prices must decline.   
In this 4 object-auction, if bidder B is to win only one object, his maximum payoff 
is achieved by having bidder A get the first three objects. Hence,  1 4
B π θ θ = −  which must 







− ∑ . Clearly the average price on the first three objects must be above  4 θ .  
Furthermore, if one of the first three objects was to be sold below  4 θ , bidder B would 
prefer getting this object instead of the fourth object. But bidder A would prefer bidder 
B’s payoff and so a price below  4 θ  cannot be observed. Therefore, prices must be weakly 
declining. Consider now the case j=0 (i.e., bidder A has won the first k objects and k 
others remain to be auctioned). A symmetric allocation requires that bidder B wins the 
last  k  objects  and  that  both  bidders  get  the  same  payoff.  This  requires  that 
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− > − − ∀ = − ∑ ∑ .   QED  
 
The number of conditions increases with k (or n) because the symmetric allocation 
is pitted against a larger number of potential asymmetric allocations. Furthermore, the 
conditions supporting a symmetric  allocation become increasingly stringent  when the 
number  of  objects  increases.  For  3 k =   ( ) 6 n = ,  it  must  be  that 
3 2
4 5 1 6
1 1
3 max 2 , m m
m m
θ θ θ θ θ θ
= =
 
− > − −  
  ∑ ∑ . These inequality restrictions can be rearranged 
as:  ( ) 3 5 2 3 6 4 2 , 3 Min θ θ θ θ θ θ + + + ≥ .  Clearly  the  differences  between  the  first  three 
valuations and the fourth one must be large compared to the differences between the 4
th 
and  the  5
th  and  6
th.  For  5 k =   ( ) 10 n = ,  one  of  the  necessary  conditions  is 
( ) 5 6 6 7 4 θ θ θ θ − ≥ − . Clearly  ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 k k k k θ θ θ θ + + + − − −  must increase significantly as the 
number of objects increases if a symmetric allocation is to be observed.   
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Proposition 2: When n, the number of successive second-price auctions with two bidders 
{A,B}  having  similar  declining  marginal  valuations,  is  uneven,  the  allocation  is 
asymmetric and the price pattern is always declining with possibly flat segments. 
  
Proof. As for an asymmetric allocation when the number of objects is even in proposition 
1, prices must be weakly declining because of payoff symmetry. Consider an auction 
with n = 3 and bidder A winning 2 objects and bidder B winning only one.  Bidder B 
“waits” to win the last object for a payoff  of  1 3.
B π θ θ = −  Bidder A must be indifferent 
between winning the first two objects or taking bidder B’s place as the winner of a single 
object and vice versa. Furthermore, when the second object is put for sale, bidder B must 
be indifferent between his payoffs from waiting for the third object or getting the second 
object. Bidder A knows that and the price for the second and third objects is the same:  3 θ  
which  explains  the  flat  segment.  Therefore,  payoff  symmetry  requires  that  the  price 
sequence be:  { } 2 3 3 , , p θ θ θ = . Because players A and B can be interchanged, there are two 
symmetric equilibria with the same weakly declining price pattern.   QED    
 
Figure  3  illustrates  the  results  of  proposition  1  and  2  via  a  few  examples.  The  first 
example illustrates the case for 4 objects with declining valuations equal to { } 10,7,5,4  
for each bidder. The condition in proposition 1 is met and the equilibrium is characterized 
by  a  constant  price.  The  5-object  example  with  bidders’  valuations  equal  to 
{ } 20,15,12,10,2  generates weakly declining prices:  { } 16,8,8,8,3 p = . A similar outcome 
also  emerges  with  our  6-object  example  with  bidders’  valuations  equal  to 
{ } 20,15,12,10,7,6 .  Even  though  bidders  have  symmetric  valuations,  they  can  safely 
exploit rapid declines in valuations through asymmetric allocations. For the same reason, 
a symmetric (inefficient) allocation can arise when bidders have asymmetric valuations 
as shown by Katzman (1999).      
Our analysis can be generalized for cases involving more than 2 bidders. In the 3-
bidder case with n a multiple of 3, the symmetric allocation entails having bidders A,B,C 
winning  3 k n ≡  objects at a constant price  1 k p θ + = . When the game is at a point where 
n-3 objects have been sold such that bidders A,B,C have { } , , 3 k k k −  objects, then bidder 
C must decide whether it is best to get the last three objects or to get only one and letting 








− ∑ ≥  2 2 k k θ θ − + − . This is a necessary, but not 
sufficient  condition.  However,  if  9 n = ,  we  are  comparing  allocations  { } 3,3,3   and 
{ } 4,4,1   and  our  necessary  condition  for  a  symmetric  allocation  is  2 3 5 θ θ θ + + > 4 3θ . 
Other asymmetric allocations, { } 5,2,2  and { } 7,1,1  impose additional conditions, namely: 
3 2
4 6 1 8
1 1
3 max 2 , i i
i i
θ θ θ θ θ θ
= =
 
− > − −  
  ∑ ∑   or  ( ) 3 6 2 3 8 4 2 , 3 Min θ θ θ θ θ θ + + + > .  The  drop  in 
valuation between the k
th and k+1






We analyze sequential second-price auctions under complete information when bidders 
have identical decreasing marginal valuations over n objects ( 1 ... n θ θ > > ). We show that 
a symmetric (asymmetric) allocation with each is bidder getting k objects is characterized 
by  constant  (weakly  declining)  prices.  Generally,  symmetric  allocations  require  that 
valuations be such that  1 k k θ θ + −  be larger than  1 2 k k θ θ + + − . The decreases in valuations 
from the k+1
th object must be increasingly small relative to the decrease in valuation 
between  the  k
th  and  k+1
th  objects  as  the  number  of  objects  auctioned  increases,  thus 
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Figure 1.  The complete information two-bidder two-object second-price auction with 

















1 0 , 7 , 5 , 4 i θ =
2 0 ,1 5 , 1 2 ,1 0 , 3 i θ =
2 0 ,1 5 , 1 2 , 1 0 , 7 , 6 i θ =
 
Figure 3. Examples of price patterns when bidders are symmetric. 
 